INTRODUCTION
From 2010 through 2014, the Supreme Court issued thirteen class action decisions.
1 This unprecedented flurry started with Shady Grove * Robert Howell Hall Professor of Law, Emory University. I am grateful to Tom Arthur and Frank Lowrey IV for comments on an earlier draft and to Lacey Elmore, Emory Law Class of 2016, for outstanding editorial and research assistance. I am grateful for the invitation to participate in this Symposium. 1. I say "decisions" as opposed to "cases" to denote opinions in which the Court addressed some aspect of class practice. In some cases, the Court addressed a substantive issue that just happened to arise in a class suit. For example, in Northwest Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422 (U.S. 2014), the Court held that the Airline Deregulation Act preempted state-law claims being asserted by a putative class. Moreover, although the Court granted certiorari in three cases to resolve an issue involving the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), the three were consolidated and resulted in one opinion. Despite all this, the ledger is fuller on the defendants' side. 12 In four principal ways, recent case law does not augur well for plaintiffs. First, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v . Dukes, the Court restricted the recovery of money in Rule 23(b)(2) classes. 13 Second, in the same case, it increased the showing required for satisfaction of the commonality requirement under Rule 23(a)(2). 14 Third, there is a clear trend toward "front-loading" class litigationthat is, the need to do more and prove more in the early stages of the case. The Court has made clear that certification does not raise a question of pleading, but must be based upon "conclusive proof." The fact that the evidence overlaps with the substantive merits of the dispute is irrelevant. Further, it is likely that expert testimony bearing on certification must be from witnesses qualified under the Federal Rules of Evidence and after a full Daubert hearing. 15 Moreover, in damages cases, the representative must prove that damages can be demonstrated on a class-wide basis. 16 Front-loading increases the expense of gaining certification. Though both sides are affected, the burden may fall harder on plaintiffs' counsel, who likely will be working on a contingent fee. The increased scope of litigation requires greater outlay by counsel to progress to the adjudication stage.
Fourth, and most consequentially, the Court has countenanced the wholesale avoidance of dispute resolution by upholding contractual "waivers" of the right to seek group vindication of rights. Such provisions are commonly found in conjunction with arbitration clauses. Successful melding of arbitration clauses with class "waivers" means that many claims (particularly negative-value claims) will never be asserted. 17 This Article discusses each of the thirteen Supreme Court decisions with the goal of drawing at least tentative conclusions for their impact on federal class practice. The thirteen decisions may be placed into five groups. Only three of the cases directly involve the general interpretation and application of Rule 23, while the other ten fall into four particular substantive areas. Reflecting these divisions, this Article proceeds in five parts. Part I discusses the three cases directly interpreting Rule 23. Part II addresses the three decisions involving securities classes brought under Rule 10b-5. Part III discusses the three decisions involving the Federal Arbitration Act. Part IV engages the two decisions addressing the non-party status of class members. And Part V concerns those decisions interpreting specialized grants of federal jurisdiction.
I. INTERPRETING RULE 23
This section addresses the three decisions that interpret Rule 23 directly. Of course, these cases affect federal class actions generally, regardless of the substantive claims asserted.
A. Shady Grove: Saving Diversity Class Actions
In Shady Grove, an insurance company failed to make timely payments of benefits. 18 Plaintiffs filed a federal class action, which invoked jurisdiction under the Class Actions Fairness Act (CAFA). 19 Class members asserted small statutory claims to recover interest on the overdue insurance benefits (the representative's claim, for instance, was for $500). 20 The New York Civil Practice Law forbade assertion of such claims in a class; they had to be pursued individually. 21 Everyone agreed that the case satisfied the requirements for certification under Rule 23. 22 But can the federal courts permit a class action when state law would not? The Court said yes, but it was close.
Five justices concluded that Rule 23 was on-point and clashed with state law and, thus, that the matter was governed by Hanna v. Plumer. 23 They went on to find the provision valid under the Rules Enabling Act (REA). 24 The four dissenters concluded that Rule 23 did not "answer the 25 Shady Grove's principal legacy, then, will be in vertical choice-of-law and not in class action practice. Nonetheless, two aspects of the case are relevant for the present purpose.
First, the majority concluded that the issue of whether Rule 23 "answer[ed] the question in dispute" was easy. 26 Over a decade before, in his majority opinion in Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 27 Justice Scalia opined that courts should interpret ambiguous federal directives narrowly to avoid different outcomes in federal and state court. 28 In Shady Grove, he reiterated that position but concluded that Rule 23 was not ambiguous. 29 The provision was susceptible of only one reading, and applied to the facts of the case. 30 Justice Scalia wrote for himself and three others. 31 On this point, however, Justice Stevens joined, so five justices agreed that Rule 23 governed the matter in dispute. 32 Second, it is important to give Shady Grove its due in preserving federal class practice. Had the case been decided the other way, two things would now be true. One, class practice could differ significantly from federal court to federal court (depending on state law). Two, state legislatures could prohibit class litigation not only in their courts but in federal tribunals as well, at least in diversity of citizenship cases. So, as Professor Mullenix reminds us, Shady Grove saved the federal diversity class action from "a near-death experience." 33 And it is of at least passing note that in Shady Grove the "conservative wing" of the Court, in rebutting this existential threat, supported consumers (by allowing a class action that would not be permitted in state court) while the "liberal wing" supported big business's assertion that it should be free from aggregate litigation in any court. The "conservative" wing supported federal preemption of state law, 34 while the "liberal" wing championed application of state law.
B. Wal-Mart: The Certification Bar
In Wal-Mart, the lower courts approved a nationwide class of roughly 1,500,000 of the retail giant's female employees. 35 Class members asserted Title VII sex discrimination claims regarding pay and lack of promotion.
36 Wal-Mart divides its 3,400 stores into 41 regions.
37
Store managers make pay and promotion decisions locally with limited central oversight. 38 Plaintiffs argued that this local discretion was exercised disproportionately in favor of men and created a corporate culture of discrimination. 39 The Ninth Circuit upheld class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) for injunctive and monetary relief (in the form of back pay).
40
The Supreme Court reversed on two grounds. Unanimously, the justices concluded that the monetary relief was improper in a Rule 23(b)(2) class. 41 Then, by a five-to-four margin, the Court held that the class failed to satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).
42
Along the way, the Court threw in some hints (and maybe some holdings) on several procedural points.
The limitation of remedies in Rule 23(b)(2) classes seems plainly 34. The scope of that preemption under Hanna is narrower than some plaintiffs have contended. For example, in Mitchell-Tracey v. United Gen. Title Ins. Co., 442 F. App'x 2 (4th Cir. 2011), the class representative argued that satisfaction of Rule 23 meant that members did not have to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the relevant state law. The Fourth Circuit pointed out that Shady Grove involved an "explicit state-law prohibition" on aggregate litigation; it could discern no "basis on which to read it as excusing named class action plaintiffs from the threshold procedural requirements that they would face as individual litigants. correct. Again, the Court was unanimous on the point, and I am not alone in thinking that the Ninth Circuit invited reversal by overreaching in approving the nationwide certification. 43 Rule 23(b)(2), according to the Court, focuses on "indivisible relief." 44 There are important distinctions between mandatory classes under Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2), on the one hand, and opt-out classes under Rule 23(b)(3), on the other. The former do not require showings of predominant common questions or superiority of class litigation because those characteristics are assumed. 45 Classes satisfying Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) are cohesive either because individual litigation would be impossible or because the relief sought automatically inures to the benefit of all. In view of this inherent cohesiveness, due process does not require that class members be notified of their membership in the class or be given the right to opt out of the class.
46
In contrast, the Rule 23(b)(3) class bundles individual claims that are bound only by common questions. 47 These class members are yoked not by legal relationships but merely by facts -they happened, for instance, to be on the same airplane or to use the same defective product. Because of the lack of relational cohesiveness, due process requires that classes predominantly asserting individual monetary claims provide the additional procedural protections of notice and an opportunity to opt 44. This conclusion, all justices agreed, is supported by the terms of the Rule, which require that relief must be appropriate "respecting the class as a whole" and that the defendant "acted on grounds that apply generally to the class." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). The conclusion is also supported by history, because the provision was written to facilitate desegregation, where conduct could be remedied by a single class-wide order. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557-58.
45. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558. 46. In the wake of Wal-Mart, the Federal Circuit addressed an interesting issue in Beer v. United States. There, an earlier case (Williams) was certified as a Rule 23(b)(2) class on behalf of Article III judges. It argued that Congress's failure to give cost-of-living adjustments to judges' salaries violates the Compensation Clause because it results in a de facto reduction of judicial pay. The class sought a declaration of compensation due. Class members were not given notice or an opportunity to opt out. The judges lost on the merits. Beer is a separate class action asserting the same claim, and the question is whether class members were bound by the judgment in Williams. The answer is no. The Federal Circuit concluded that Williams, though brought under Rule 23(b)(2) was about the payment of money; it was essentially a claim for damages. Under Wal-Mart, due process requires notice in such a case. Because it was not given, the members were not bound. The court declined to address whether due process also required a right to opt out. Because the class members in Beer were not bound by Williams, the court was free to decide the merits. out.
48
The back pay claims in Wal-Mart, unlike those in some Rule 23(b)(2) cases, did not flow naturally from the injunctive relief that was being sought. Indeed, injunctive relief would be meaningless for about half the class members because they no longer worked for Wal-Mart. 49 Moreover, because of different circumstances around the country, back pay would not be readily calculable; the claims were not liquidated and there was no ready formula for determining figures for the group. 50 Thus, back pay determinations would require myriad individual determinations, which, the Court concluded, would predominate over any common questions. 51 Here, the Court threw in one of its hints without an express holding: when individual determinations predominate, there is "the serious possibility" that due process requires that class members be given notice and the opportunity to opt out of the class. 52 This "serious possibility" counseled the Court to interpret Rule 23(b)(2) narrowly and to reject certification.
53
Wal-Mart reins in practice under Rule 23(b)(2) to a degree. Through the years, some lower courts had allowed recovery of monetary relief in 23(b)(2) classes. They did so on three theories, two of which are rejected by Wal-Mart. First, some courts justified recovery of money that could be characterized as "equitable" relief, such as restitution. 54 But, as the Court pointed out in Wal-Mart, Rule 23(b)(2) speaks only of "injunctive" and "declaratory" relief, and not of general "equitable" remedies. 55 Second, some courts held that money could be recovered as long as the demand for equitable relief "predominates."
56 But, again, as the Court noted in Wal-Mart, Rule 23(b)(2) does not use that term; predominance is a factor only in Rule 23(b)(3) classes.
57
Only the third theory survives Wal-Mart. This permits recovery of money in a Rule 23(b)(2) class when the sum will "flow directly from liability to the class as a whole on the claims forming the basis of the 59 There, the injunction ordered the promotion of class members from one pay grade to another. 60 Back pay flowed automatically from the fact that the class members were underemployed, which was remedied by the injunction for all class members in the same way -they were all bumped up a level. 61 In this circumstance, the dollar figure for back pay is essentially liquidated: it consists of the difference between the pay grades multiplied by the time each was underemployed.
62 After Wal-Mart, this theory remains viable, and lower courts seem to be hewing the line.
63
In Wal-Mart, the Ninth Circuit had tried to get around the need for individual hearings on back pay by prescribing a trial by formula: a subset of cases would be tried, and other class members' back pay would be extrapolated from those results. 64 The , involved a class of black securities brokers who alleged that their employer engaged in racial discrimination in selection of teams and distribution of accounts. The district court denied certification and the Seventh Circuit, on Rule 23(f) appeal, reversed. Although local managers for the brokerage firm had considerable discretion in setting up teams of brokers and distributing accounts, the case differed from Wal-Mart because they acted under two company-wide policies; these policies could account for disparate impact among employees. Thus, the court instructed the lower court to certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class for determining common issues. Interestingly, however, the court did not permit recovery of money in the Rule 23(b)(2) class. Rather, if the class were to be successful, pecuniary relief -back pay and possibly compensatory or punitive damages -could be sought in "hundreds of separate suits. 66. Usually, the concern under the Rules Enabling Act (REA) is whether application of a Federal Rule will modify a substantive right under state law. In Wal-Mart, the concern was that trial by formula, as envisioned by the Ninth Circuit, would rob the defendant of a federal substantive right -the right under Title VII to present defenses to individual claims.
One upshot of Wal-Mart may be an increased number of motions to certify "hybrid" classes, which seek injunctive or declaratory relief under Rule 23(b)(2) and monetary relief under Rule 23(b)(3).
67
Though important, the holding on Rule 23(b)(2) pales beside the five-to-four portion of the case addressing the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2). Because commonality is a prerequisite for all class actions, a higher hurdle on this score affects practice under all three types of classes under Rule 23(b). (Indeed, the holding on commonality doomed any effort to seek certification as a Rule 23(b)(3) class in WalMart.)
On its face, the holding -that the class claims failed to present any common question 68 -is surprising. Commonality had never been much of a factor. It was all but impossible to find cases in which courts denied certification because of a failure to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2). 69 With WalMart, commonality becomes a more serious hurdle to certification. The majority confirmed that Rule 23(a)(2) requires that only a single question be common to the class members' claims. 70 According to the Justice Scalia voiced the general concern of the effect of class actions on substantive rights in Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Scott. There, he wrote as Circuit Justice of the Fifth Circuit and stayed a Louisiana intermediate appellate court ruling. The case, a class action brought on behalf of all smokers in Louisiana, was based upon common law fraud and alleged that the defendant tobacco companies had "distorted the entire body of public knowledge" about the addictive effect of nicotine. The state appellate court upheld a judgment on that theory of about $250,000,000, to be used to fund a 10-year smoking cessation program in Louisiana. 131 S. Ct. 1 (U.S. 2010). Justice Scalia focused on one asserted error. The state court recognized that an individual plaintiff attempting to recover damages would be required (as part of the fraud claim) to show reliance on a knowing misstatement by the defendant. In this class action (seeking payment into a fund that will benefit the class), however, the plaintiffs need make no such showing. This was because the trial court had found that the entire class relied upon the defendants' distortion of "the entire body of public knowledge." Moreover, defendants were not permitted to argue that particular plaintiffs did not rely on the alleged misrepresentations. As a result, individuals who could not recover if they sued alone will be permitted to recover because the litigation is structured as a class suit. Justice Scalia concluded: "The extent to which class treatment may constitutionally reduce the normal requirements of due process is an important question." Id. at 4. Particularly because intrastate classes such as this cannot be removed to federal court under CAFA, he was concerned that "the constraints of the Due Process Clause will be the only federal protection." Id. 68. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556-57. 69. To the extent commonality got much of an airing in the case law, it was in Rule 23(b)(3), which requires that common questions predominate over individual questions. In retrospect, however, perhaps we should not be surprised at the holding: the Court itself added the Rule 23(a)(2) issue to the case when it granted certiorari. Obviously, then, at least four justices wanted the issue on the table. 70. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556.
Ninth Circuit, the common question was whether the members were subject to a single set of policies (as opposed to independent discriminatory acts) that favored men over women. 71 The Supreme Court shifted the focus of the inquiry. The key is not whether one can posit common questions, but whether the class litigation will generate common answers that will drive resolution of the case. 72 In other words, the class members must suffer the same injury and not simply violation of the same law. Their claims "must depend upon a common contention," such as bias on the part of the same supervisor.
73 That common contention "must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution -which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke." 74 In Wal-Mart, the majority concluded that there was no such "glue"
75 -the litigation of no single issue would generate an answer for the entire class. Any discrimination was the result of thousands of individual judgment calls, which presented no commonality under Rule 23(a)(2).
76
The Ninth Circuit had concluded that there was proof of a policy of company-wide discrimination, relying on the expert opinion of a sociologist. 77 The Plaintiffs were no more successful in relying on statistics and anecdotal evidence to show that individual decisions were made in a common way. The statistics may have showed differentials between genders, but did nothing to identify a "specific employment practice" that caused it. 83 And the anecdotal evidence was too skimpy, constituting only one story per 12,500 class members and touching upon only 235 stores. 84 There was no commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) because there was "no convincing proof of a companywide discriminatory pay and promotion policy."
85 Plaintiffs thus failed in three ways -by sociological analysis, statistics, and anecdotal evidence -to show an employment practice that would tie together 1,500,000 claims. In practice, though, it is not clear how much higher the hurdle may be. In a later case, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that this new standard does not mean that differences in the harm suffered by class members will defeat commonality. The Wal-Mart requirement that class members "have suffered the same injury" 91 is satisfied by showing a common instance of injurious conduct even though class members' harm may vary dramatically.
92 Wal-Mart clearly does not require that every question be common; rather, Rule 23(a)(2) is satisfied by "a single significant question of law or fact."
93 Indeed, to a surprising extent, some district courts (perhaps particularly in the Ninth Circuit) continue to rely upon pre-Wal-Mart authority in determining whether commonality is satisfied. 94 Though it is hard to quantify how Wal-Mart commonality might be more rigorous than earlier practice, the focus on generating common answers rather than asking common questions is new. It causes courts to engage the commonality requirement to a degree rarely encountered before. And, undeniably, this increased engagement results in rejection would be confused by defendant's packaging). of some certification motions for failure to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2). 95 Even if we conclude that Wal-Mart brings negligible change in the standards for Rule 23(a)(2) and Rule 23(b)(2), the case makes life more difficult for plaintiff classes by injecting various procedural hurdles, sometimes through passing remarks. We have already seen two: the suggestion (if not holding) that expert witnesses giving evidence regarding certification be vetted under Daubert 96 and the "serious possibility" that due process require notices and opt-out for class members seeking individualized monetary recovery. 97 There are others, and they raise the expense of litigating class certification.
For starters, "Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard." 98 Instead, plaintiff must "be prepared to prove that . . . in fact" the requirements are met. 99 Quoting General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 100 the Court noted that there must be "rigorous analysis," "significant proof," and "actual, not presumed, conformance with Rule 23." 101 Plainly, then, certification is not to be decided on the pleadings; the parties must present and the court must consider evidence.
In assessing this proof, one nagging question has been what the Court meant in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin 102 when it implied that a court dealing with class certification should not decide facts that overlap with the underlying merits. In Falcon, the Court seemed to retrench, saying that consideration of the merits may be unavoidable when ruling on certification. 103 Wal-Mart now makes this clear, calling the implication to the contrary in Eisen "purest dictum." 104 In Eisen, the issue was shifting the cost of notice in a Rule 23(b)(3) class from the representative to the defendant. 105 The district court in that case allocated the cost based upon its assessment of likelihood that the plaintiff would prevail on the merits. 106 It was in that context (and not class certification) that the Court decried consideration of the merits. There is no need for such timidity in ruling on class certification, and Wal-Mart fosters frontloading by envisioning that courts may consider and even rule upon factual issues that implicate the merits.
107

C. Comcast: Increased Procedural Front-Loading
In Comcast, the Court revisited the topic of evidentiary proof at certification. This was an antitrust case in which the plaintiffs asserted that Comcast unlawfully "clustered" cable television providers in the Philadelphia area, thereby excluding entities that could provide competitive alternatives for cable service. 108 The big questions at certification were whether antitrust injury and damages could be demonstrated on a class-wide basis. 109 The plaintiffs asserted four theories of antitrust impact. 110 The district court rejected three of these and permitted the case to proceed only on an "overbuilder" theory of impact. 111 The expert testimony on damages, however, was aimed at showing damages under all four of the original theories of antitrust impact.
112 It was not limited to the "overbuilder" theory.
113
Despite this disconnect between the substantive theory of impact and the damages model, the Third Circuit held that impact and damages were susceptible of class-wide proof. 114 This holding supported certification under Rule 23(b)(3) because it ensured that common questions predominated. 115 Moreover, the court refused to allow Comcast to challenge the damages model at certification because, it 107. Of course, a court should not decide merits-based issues unrelated to certification. "Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage. Merits questions may be considered to the extent -but only to the extent -that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied." Amgen Inc. 109. Plaintiffs need not prove the antitrust injury or damages themselves at certification. Rather, they must demonstrate that at trial they will be able to prove "to the satisfaction of a jury that 'all putative class members suffered an injury and that the injury resulted from anti-competitive harms to the market as a whole. ' concluded, such arguments would improperly enmesh the court in consideration of the underlying merits. 116 Finally, the expert evidence on damages was not vetted under Daubert.
The Court granted certiorari on the question of "whether a district court may certify a class action without resolving whether the plaintiff class had introduced admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to show that the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis."
117 Comcast waived the Daubert issue by failing to object to the admission of plaintiffs' expert testimony. 118 Though this failure made it impossible for Comcast to argue that the testimony was not "admissible evidence," Comcast remained free to argue that the evidence (when admitted) failed to show that damages could be shown on a class-wide basis.
119
The Court reversed certification. 120 The five-member majority emphasized that its ruling was based upon Rule 23 and not on substantive antitrust law.
121 It made three significant pronouncements. First, the need for "evidentiary proof" (as opposed to allegations) required in Wal-Mart applies to Rule 23(b) as well as to Rule 23(a). 123 Second, because of the need for litigation of whether common questions predominated, the lower courts erred by not permitting Comcast to present evidence against the plaintiffs' proffered damages model. 124 And third, that model was fatally flawed because it was not limited to the "overbuilder" theory of antitrust impact. was worthless. In Wal-Mart, the expert could not say that the Wal-Mart "culture" he perceived had affected a single employment decision. 126 In Comcast, the class-wide proof on damages did not match the theory of antitrust impact and, therefore, of liability.
127
With Wal-Mart and Comcast, the Court has done more than limit the availability of monetary relief in Rule 23(b)
This front-loading increases the expense of litigating class certification. More is on the table at an early stage than in prior practice. I call this "procedural front-loading" because it is imposed by Rule 23. We turn next to efforts by defendants to front-load certification litigation further by insisting that certain substantive matters be litigated at the certification stage. The examples come from securities fraud cases. announcement is made, and the price of the stock falls. Everyone agrees that a class of buyers or sellers of the stock will satisfy Rule 23(a). The question is whether common questions can predominate for certification of a damages class under Rule 23(b)(3).
To prevail on the merits in a private Rule 10b-5 case, plaintiffs must demonstrate various elements, which include material misrepresentation, 131 scienter, and a connection between the misrepresentation and the purchase or sale of a security. We focus here on three other elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim: (1) reliance (the plaintiff must have relied on the misrepresentation); (2) materiality (the misrepresentation must have been about something a reasonable investor would have considered important); and (3) "loss causation." The third, imposed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, requires plaintiffs to show that their loss resulted from the misrepresentation and its correction, and not from some other (e.g., macro-economic) cause. There it endorsed the "fraud-on-the-market" theory, which creates a rebuttable presumption of reliance. 134 The presumption arises when the stock is traded on an efficient market and the material misstatement was made publicly. 135 The idea is that efficient markets factor into the stock price the entire mix of public information -good and bad. 136 As the Court later explained, the presumption attaches if (1) the misstatement was made publicly, (2) was material, (3) the securities market on which the security is traded is efficient, and (4) the plaintiff bought or sold during the relevant time frame. 137 Without Basic, few (if any) Rule 10b-5 damages classes could be certified. 138 The representative bears the burden at the certification stage
131. An omission of fact may also be actionable under Rule 10b-5, but for convenience we will assume a case based upon misrepresentation.
132. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2012) (plaintiff "shall have the burden of proving that the act or omission of the defendant . . . caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.").
133 of demonstrating that the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance should attach. 139 If she satisfies this burden, reliance is presumed for the entire class and presents no individual questions. 140 The defendant is free to rebut the presumption, but this is a tough row to hoe. For example, the defendant might show that individual class members in fact did not rely on the misstatement. Such proof would be rare, and would probably only pick off a few class members at most.
Through the years, the Fifth Circuit required that the representative show loss causation as a prerequisite to certification. 141 In Halliburton I, because the representative did not do so, the Fifth Circuit rejected certification.
142
The Supreme Court reversed unanimously and explained: "Loss causation has no logical connection to the facts necessary to establish the efficient market predicate to the fraud-on-themarket theory."
143 Loss causation simply has nothing to do with reliance. Thus, it is a "merits" issue to be proved at the adjudication (not the certification) stage.
144
In Amgen, the Court faced a tougher call: whether the representative, to invoke the presumption of reliance, must demonstrate materiality of the misstatement. 145 Courts of appeals had disagreed on the question and inextricable sub-question of whether the defendant should be permitted to demonstrate -again, at the certification stagethat the misstatement was not material. 146 Google for copyright infringement for providing "snippets" of millions of copyrighted works. The defendant asserted "fair use" under the copyright law. The district judge certified the plaintiff class. The Second Circuit rejected the effort, however, and ruled that the holding was premature:
On the particular facts of this case, we conclude that class certification was premature in the absence of a determination by the District Court of the merits of Google's "fair use" defense. Accordingly, we vacate the June 11, 2012 order certifying the class and remand the cause to the District Court, for consideration of the fair use issues, without prejudice to any future motion for class certification. issue because it, unlike loss causation, is relevant both for adjudication on the merits (it is an element of a Rule 10b-5 claim) and to invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption for reliance (after all, no one would rely on an immaterial misstatement about the value of securities).
In Amgen, the Court held that the representative is not required to present evidence of materiality at the certification stage. 147 Materiality, the Court explained, will always be susceptible to aggregate proof (and is either met or not met for all class members).
148 Accordingly, materiality can be decided en masse at the adjudication stage (trial or summary judgment).
149 If the class fails to demonstrate materiality, every class member's claim will be rejected on the merits. 150 Because proof of materiality is irrelevant in ruling on certification, the Court reasoned, the defendant may not attempt to rebut materiality at that stage.
151
After remand in Halliburton I, the defendant argued that it should be permitted to oppose certification by attacking the applicability of the fraud-on-the-market theory and thus the presumption of reliance.
152
Specifically, it asserted that the misstatement had no "price impact" on the facts of the case. 153 The Fifth Circuit, relying on Amgen, held that the defendant could not proffer the evidence and that the case should proceed to adjudication with the presumption of reliance intact. 154 In Halliburton II, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on that question and added the issue of whether Basic ought to be overruled. 155 Justice Scalia had raised that bombshell question during oral argument in Amgen. 156 Halliburton argued that economic science had demonstrated that the Basic presumption was flawed. 157 The Court rejected the argument and held that Halliburton had not met the heavy burden of overcoming stare decisis. As with Shady Grove, it is worth pondering how a contrary conclusion would have changed the landscape. Just as the former saved Rule 23 from evisceration by state law, Halliburton II rejected nothing less than an existential threat to private securities class actions.
Beyond this, Halliburton II clarified the discussion in Amgen of what issues may be litigated at the certification stage. As noted above, there are four requirements for invoking the fraud-on-the-market presumption: (1) the misstatement/omission was made publicly, (2) it was material, (3) the securities market is efficient, and (4) the plaintiff bought or sold the securities during the relevant time frame. 159 The Court explained that three of the four requirements -publicity, materiality, and efficiency of the market -concern "price impact"; that is, whether the misrepresentation affected the market price of the security. 160 While Amgen held that materiality is an issue to be litigated at the adjudication stage, the representative must demonstrate at certification that the other three are satisfied. 161 Without that showing, the plaintiffs cannot invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance.
162
Because these issues are on the table for certification, the defendant must be permitted to demonstrate lack of "price impact" at that time. 163 Specifically, this means that Halliburton will be permitted present evidence that the misrepresentation did not affect the market price. 164 These securities cases represent significant victories for the plaintiffs' bar. First, the Court rejected efforts to overrule Basic. Second, it rejected efforts to front-load litigation based upon substantive elements of Rule 10b-5 claims. Of course, the Court permits the defendant to attack the application of the presumption of reliance, which will add to litigation at the certification stage (though probably in very few cases). 165 164. The argument is that the public market discounted the misrepresentation/omission in light of other statements. This would appear to come very close to Halliburton's earlier argument that the misstatement/omission was not material. After Amgen and Halliburton II, Halliburton cannot introduce evidence of immateriality at the certification motion, but it can argue lack of "price impact."
165. In her concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg noted that the holding "may broaden the scope of discovery available at certification." Because the evidence will be produced by the defendant, however, she concluded that the expansion of front-loading in Halliburton II should "impose no heavy toll on securities-fraud plaintiffs with tenable claims." Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2417.
demonstrate that the Rule 23 prerequisites have been met, and not that every question will be answered on the merits in favor of the class. 166 Cases in the first two Parts of this Article have dealt with defendants' assertion that certification litigation should embrace more issues. We turn next to a more audacious assertion: that class certification may be avoided altogether.
III. AVOIDANCE: THE ARBITRATION/CLASS "WAIVER" TRUMP CARD
The Supreme Court's fulsome embrace of arbitration clauses is well chronicled. 167 The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), passed in 1925, decreed an end to judicial hostility to the enforcement of arbitration agreements. 168 At the time, arbitration clauses applied to contractual claims between business entities. In the past generation, arbitration clauses have found their way into innumerable contracts of adhesion and have expanded from contract claims to cover a wide variety of consumer, employment, tort, and federal statutory claims. The Court has been willing to uphold clauses in these new contexts, emphasizing the freedom of parties to contract on such matters. 169 More recently, many adhesion contracts have added another provision: a "waiver" of aggregate litigation 170 -that is, a clause that forbids plaintiffs from joining to assert their claims in arbitration.
This combination sets up a collision course between the procontract policy of the FAA, on the one hand, and basic access to justice, on the other. The clash is illustrated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. 171 There, customers signed up for a cellphone plan with AT&T that offered a free phone. 172 The problem was that AT&T then charged customers for sales tax on the phone ($30.22 per phone). 173 The 166. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (U.S. 2011) (emphasis in original) ("Rule 23(b)(3) requires a showing that questions common to the class predominate, not that those questions will be answered, on the merits, in favor of the class.").
167. See, e.g., 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3569 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing case law and citing literature).
168. Courts traditionally rejected arbitration clauses (and forum selection clauses, for that matter) on the theory that they constituted improper private efforts to "oust" courts of jurisdiction. See generally id. § 2569.
169. State-law contract defenses may be invoked to avoid arbitration. The most important is unconscionability.
170. Because the prohibition of aggregate assertion of claims is typically contained in a contract of adhesion, "waiver" -at least insofar as it implies voluntary relinquishment -is a euphemistic term.
171 agreement provided for arbitration of disputes and forbade class arbitration. 174 Nonetheless, the plaintiffs brought a federal class action based upon state consumer law. 175 The provider moved to compel arbitration, which the district court denied. 176 The Ninth Circuit affirmed. 177 It relied upon Discover Bank v. Superior Court, in which the California Supreme Court held that waivers of the right to collective arbitration are unconscionable if included in adhesion contracts involving negative-value consumer fraud claims. 178 The effect of the California holding was to permit the customers to demand class arbitration even though their contract with the retailer forbade it. 179 The Court reversed. 180 The five-justice majority, led by Justice Scalia, held that the FAA preempts the state case law. 181 The Court noted that Section 2 of the FAA provides for enforcement of arbitration clauses, "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 182 This "savings clause" permits invalidation of arbitration agreements on state-law grounds applicable to contracts generally (such as fraud or unconscionability), 183 but not on grounds that apply only to arbitration clauses. 184 There are two situations in which the FAA preempts state law: (1) when the state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a type of claim and (2) when a general contract defense is applied in a way that disfavors arbitration. 185 Thus, state-law rules that "stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's objectives" 186 are preempted. According to the Court, the California law in Discover Bank was such a rule. 187 One purpose of the FAA is to ensure enforcement of arbitration clauses according to their terms. 188 Another is to foster efficient, speedy dispute resolution. 189 The Court concluded that California law obstructed the latter objective by (1) replacing bilateral arbitration with a slower, expensive, procedurally complicated method "more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment"; 190 (2) placing the arbitrator in the unaccustomed position of having to protect absentees' interests; and (3) exposing the defendant to enormous potential liability based upon the outcome of a single case; this risk is exacerbated by the limited appellate review available in arbitration cases. 191 Concepcion had an immediate impact. Several courts held that the FAA preempted state consumer protection laws mandating class resolution. 192 In Kilgore v. Keybank, National Assn., 193 a non-class case, the Ninth Circuit got the message (after being reversed in Concepcion). 194 It held that the FAA preempts California law that forbids arbitration altogether (class or individual) in cases seeking public injunctive relief. 195 The theory of the California precedent is that such private attorney general cases should be litigated in court and not arbitrated. 196 Because the state case law was a blanket ban on arbitration, it interfered with the policy goals of the FAA and, under Concepcion, was preempted.
197
There are arguments against class treatment (in litigation or arbitration) in cases like Concepcion. One of the historic justifications of the class action is efficiency -it will substitute one case (albeit complex) for thousands of small ones. But negative-value claims such as those in 186 Concepcion will not be asserted individually. 198 As Judge Posner has said, only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30. 199 Because the thousands of small claims would never be filed, aggregation actually creates litigation that would never have been filed. Creating litigation usually is thought to be a bad thing. Moreover, promoting proceedings in these cases seems inconsistent with the maxim de minimis non curat lex. That precept teaches us that in this world, we occasionally have to take our lumps for $30. And, of course, aggregation of claims exposes a defendant to potentially catastrophic liability on the basis of one roll of the dice.
But there are profound policies in the other direction. Litigation and arbitration are methods of law enforcement. If no one will file a claim, the law will not be enforced. Stated another way, enforcing a class action "waiver" can be exculpatory: it gives the defendant a pass, at least as to negative-value claims that de facto will not be enforced individually. So viewed, Concepcion thwarts the power of the states to decide how to enforce their consumer protection (and other) laws. It forbids a state from permitting private vindication of its laws in lieu of (or in addition to) administrative or criminal enforcement.
Of course, state policy must bow to valid applicable federal law. According to Concepcion, a state "cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons."
200 This is an important phrase. It suggests that "waivers" of class arbitration will be upheld (when preempted by the FAA) even if it is clear that no one in the putative class will bring an individual claim. This implication is consistent with the Court's relentless theme that agreements are to be enforced by their terms. 201 On the facts, the majority in Concepcion concluded that claims would be vindicated in individual arbitration. 202 The agreement in the case was seen as 198. Notice the similarity between the class action arbitration waiver in Concepcion and the New York statute in Shady Grove. Both the contract in Concepcion and the statute in Shady Grove rule out aggregation in precisely the circumstance -the small claim case -when we fear that individual claims will not be pursued. consumer-friendly. 203 The clause required arbitration in the customer's home county, required AT&T to pay all costs, and, if the arbitration award was higher than the defendant's offer, the customer would recover $7,500 and double attorney's fees. 204 Thus, the Court did not see the provision as preventing vindication of the consumers' claims.
Consumer advocates question whether the terms of the AT&T agreement in Concepcion really promoted individual vindication of claims. 205 In Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 206 the Eleventh Circuit addressed the same contract involved in Concepcion. In Cruz, though, unlike in Concepcion, plaintiffs' lawyers submitted affidavits from attorneys averring that they would not represent consumers on an individual basis in such cases. 207 They also presented evidence that only an infinitesimal percentage of consumers actually pursued claims under the arbitration provision -notwithstanding the pro-consumer provisions. 208 The Eleventh Circuit concluded, however, that it "need not reach the question of whether Concepcion leaves open the possibility that in some cases, an arbitration agreement may be invalidated on public policy grounds where it effectively prevents the claimant from vindicating her statutory cause of action." 209 The argument, the court said, was foreclosed by Concepcion itself, which had upheld the very same class action waiver provision. 210 Lower courts appeared to read Concepcion broadly -to hold that the FAA's preemptive power is not readily tempered by the need to facilitate civil enforcement of the law. 211 In the face of this trend, however, the Second Circuit went the other way in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant. 212 There, a class of restaurant owners sued American Express, alleging that the credit card company violated federal antitrust laws by using monopoly power to force them to accept credit cards at higher interest rates than those charged by competitors.
213
The agreements required arbitration and forbade aggregation. 214 Though the claims were not de minimus, plaintiffs argued that they were negative-value claims.
215 Specifically, the cost of retaining expert witnesses on the complex economic issues in such cases would be prohibitive. 216 Only if they could litigate en masse would it be feasible to retain experts and prove the case. 217 The Second Circuit struck the class action "waiver" on policy grounds. 218 It distinguished Concepcion because the plaintiffs had shown that pursuit of individual claims was not feasible. 219 The court concluded that the "federal substantive law of arbitrability" permits a court to compel class arbitration when it finds that aggregate resolution is the "only economically feasible means" for the plaintiff to pursue its federal-law claim. 220 Stated another way, "effective vindication" of the antitrust laws required invalidation of the class waiver.
221
The Court reversed, five to three, 222 with Justice Scalia again writing for the majority. Here, the Court could not say, as it could in Concepcion, that provisions in the arbitration clause facilitated individual vindication of claims. 223 The Court was willing to accept that individual litigation would be infeasible economically. 224 Still, Concepcion governed. 225 The majority explained that nothing in the FAA, the antitrust laws, or Rule 23 evinces an intention to prohibit parties from foregoing their right to assert class claims.
226
More importantly, the Court discussed the "effective vindication" argument embraced by the Second Circuit. 227 It recognized that "public policy" can invalidate agreements that operate "as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies."
228 But nothing in the present agreement impeded the plaintiffs' ability to pursue statutory remedies. 229 The substantive damages claim asserted under the Sherman Act was created 48 years before promulgation of the original Rule 23 made it possible to aggregate such claims. 230 The fact that it is not worth the expense of proving the claim "does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy." 231 In short, "the antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim."
232 Bluntly, then, the majority concluded that a prohibitively expensive path to vindicate one's rights is not equivalent to the elimination of those rights.
233
The Court's FAA cases elevate contract over various substantive policies: the plaintiffs agreed (1) to arbitrate instead of litigate and (2) to go it alone. Unless Congress provides that aggregate litigation is necessary for vindication of particular claims, the parties will be bound by their contract. 234 And because of the supremacy of federal law, state law will not be permitted to require group vindication.
235
Of course, parties are free to contract to arbitrate en masse. Presumably, such agreements are rare, and many contracts will not address the issue expressly. In those cases, Oxford Health gives some solace to plaintiffs. 236 There, the arbitrator interpreted the arbitration clause to manifest an agreement to class treatment. 237 Applying the FAA's limited provision for judicial review of arbitration decisions, the Court upheld the order. 238 Oxford Health is consistent with the procontract policy of the Court's other decisions.
239
Though Oxford Health opens the door for class proceedings, it is not much of an opening. After all, corporations can simply insert class "waivers" into their arbitration provisions. The current state of affairs under Concepcion and Italian Colors is not encouraging for private enforcement of law through the class mechanism. This problem, however, is not the result of class action jurisprudence. It is a result of the Court's FAA jurisprudence, which uncritically has applied that Act to contracts and claims not envisioned when it was passed. There is, however, no indication that the Court is willing to retreat from its position. Efforts for legislative change have failed. Though the trend threatens aggregate assertion of claims, obviously, not all claims will be subject to contractual limitation. When class litigation proceeds, it is important to determine when the representative's acts can bind class members. We address aspects of that question next. 241 decided in 2013, concern the fundamental principle that one who has not been accorded a "day in court" cannot be bound by a judgment. Smith involved overlapping classes: Case 1 was in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, 242 and Case 2 was in state court. 243 In each, essentially the same class (with different representatives) sued Bayer under West Virginia law for an allegedly defective product. 244 The federal court denied certification under Rule 23(b)(3) because common 237. The parties agreed to submit any "civil action" to arbitration. Because class actions are civil actions, the arbitrator concluded, the parties intended to permit class proceedings. Id. at 2067.
IV. STATUS OF CLASS MEMBERS IN AN UNCERTIFIED CLASS
238. The arbitrator did not "exceed [his] powers" under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4), so a court is powerless to vacate the order. As the Court explained in Oxford Health, the question under that provision is "whether the arbitrator (even arguably) interpreted the parties' contract, not whether he got its meaning right or wrong." Id. at 2071.
239. The case is to be distinguished from Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010). There, the arbitrator exceeded his powers by ordering class arbitration in light of the parties' stipulation that they did not agree on the issue of class proceedings. questions would not predominate under applicable state law. 245 The federal court then issued an anti-suit injunction against prosecution of the state class action. 246 It invoked the "re-litigation exception" to the Anti-Injunction Statute, which permits an injunction against state proceedings if necessary to protect or effectuate the federal court's judgments. 247 The Eighth Circuit 248 held that the finding on whether common questions predominated under Rule 23(b)(3) was entitled to issue preclusion and thus that the injunction was justified.
249
The Court reversed unanimously. 250 First, Case 1 and Case 2 did not present the same issue. 251 Though West Virginia has adopted Rule 23, it interprets the provision differently from federal courts. 252 Thus a finding of predominance of common questions under one did not address the same issue as that raised under the other. 253 Second, the representative in Case 2 could not be bound by the judgment in Case 1. 254 True, he was a class member in Case 1, but he was not the representative, and thus, he was not a party. 255 And because class certification was denied, he could not be bound by the result in Case 1-he had not had his day in court.
256
Knowles does something similar. Here, the representative filed a class action in state court asserting a state-law claim for alleged breach of homeowners' insurance policies. 257 In the complaint and in an attached affidavit, he expressly limited the amount the class would seek to under $5,000,000. 258 The obvious intent was to defeat removal under 258. The writ of certiorari and briefs in the case spoke of the representative's "stipulation" to limit the amount sought by the class. The complaint alleged that the representative and class CAFA, which requires aggregated class claims in excess of $5,000,000.
259
The defendant removed to federal court under CAFA and showed by a preponderance of the evidence that the claims in fact totaled slightly more than $5,000,000. 260 The burden then shifted to the representative to show to a legal certainty that the claims did not exceed $5,000,000.
261
The district court ordered remand, holding that the statement in the complaint -eschewing damages of more than $5,000,000 -was effective. 262 The Eighth Circuit declined interlocutory review, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
263
The Court vacated the district court's ruling and held that the case invoked subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA. 264 It recognized that a plaintiff can defeat removal by stipulating that she will not accept an amount that would satisfy the jurisdictional amount in controversy requirement. 265 But such a stipulation must be binding on the plaintiff.
266
In Knowles, the class representative had no authority to bind the class members to the stipulation because the court had not certified a class.
267
Accordingly, the representative was not in a position to bind the absentee putative class members. 268 The Court explained:
[A] plaintiff who files a proposed class action cannot legally bind members of the proposed class before the class is certified. . . . Because his precertification stipulation does not bind anyone but himself, "stipulate they will seek to recover total aggregate damages of less than five million dollars." In an attached affidavit, the representative said that he "will not at any time . . . seek damages for the class . . . in excess of $5,000,000 in the aggregate." Id. 259. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2012). To keep the class claims below $5,000,000, the representative sought only two years' worth of damages on behalf of the class members (of a total of five years that would be permitted under the statute of limitations Knowles may be seen to promote plaintiff class practice by forbidding a representative from bargaining away class members' rights to sue for the maximum recovery possible. On the other hand, Knowles permits defendants to remove cases to federal court under CAFA (assuming minimal diversity) by showing that the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000.
Smith is far more important for plaintiffs because it allows serial relitigation of class certification. For instance, suppose Rep-1 seeks to represent Class. The court denies certification, however, because, let's say, common questions do not predominate. Smith permits Rep-2 to step up to represent the same class for the same claim. Because class certification was denied in Rep-1's case, no class member is bound by the unsuccessful effort. In theory, the defendant would have to defeat any number of serial certification efforts -to face what Professor Redish calls "death by a thousand cuts." 270 The pro-plaintiff bent of Smith is not the result of developments under Rule 23. It is born of the day-in-court principle, which is ultimately rooted in due process. Smith and Knowles are nice complements to Taylor v. Sturgell, 271 in which the Court rejected virtual representation and described the limited circumstances in which a nonparty may be precluded by a judgment. 272 Smith points out that even states that adopt the Federal Rules are not required to adopt the Court's interpretation of Rule 23. 273 It is not clear, for example, that state courts will follow Wal-Mart in applying the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) or the federal view on procedural front-loading of certification. 274 For these and other reasons, 275 class plaintiffs may prefer to litigate in state court. They face increased obstacles, however, from expansions of federal jurisdiction. The clearest example, of course, is CAFA, which allows a single defendant to remove state-court class actions to federal court based upon minimal diversity of citizenship and an aggregate amount in controversy of $5,000,000.
276 Such powerful magnets make it more difficult for state-court plaintiffs to stay in state court. As we see now, however, the Court has given at least some aspects of these grants a limited interpretation.
V. LIMITED INTERPRETATIONS OF CAFA AND SLUSA
The two remaining cases feature interpretations, respectively, of CAFA and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA). Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp. was a parens patriae action brought by Mississippi against manufacturers of liquid crystal displays. The suit, filed in state court, alleged violations of state law and sought restitution on behalf of itself and its citizens. 277 The defendants removed under the "mass action" provision of CAFA. 278 This permits federal jurisdiction based upon minimal diversity not only of class actions but of suits (brought in states that do not recognize the class action, such as Mississippi) for monetary relief brought by 100 or more persons. 279 The Court held that Mississippi was the only plaintiff and rejected the argument that those on whose behalf the state sued should be considered. 280 This interpretation of CAFA permits states or their officers to sue on behalf of citizens, to avoid the capacious jurisdiction of CAFA, and remain in state court.
281
Chadbourne & Parke 282 involved consolidated state-court class actions that alleged violations of state law through defendants' Ponzi scheme in sale of certificates of deposit. 283 SLUSA prohibits securities class actions based upon state law when the alleged misrepresentation or omission concerns a "covered security." 284 The certificates of deposit at issue in the case were not "covered," but the alleged fraud consisted of misrepresentations that they were backed by covered securities. 285 The Court held that SLUSA applies only when the actual trading is in covered securities. 286 Because the alleged misrepresentation did not involve such investments, SLUSA did not apply, and the case was permitted to proceed in state court. 287 The holdings in these cases are jurisdictional and will not affect class practice per se. In each, though, the Court's narrow interpretations uphold the plaintiff's choice of state-court forum.
CONCLUSION
To be sure, there is good news for plaintiffs in this group of thirteen cases. The continued viability of Federal Rule 23 against state encroachment was assured in Shady Grove. The Court turned back attempted inroads on damages class actions for violations of Rule 10b-5 in two ways: first, by retaining the presumption of reliance in fraud on the market cases in Amgen and, second, by rejecting efforts to require proof of loss causation and materiality at certification in Halliburton I and Amgen. In addition, efforts to bind class members in the absence of certification were rebuffed in Smith and Knowles. Finally, narrow interpretations of jurisdictional provisions in Mississippi ex rel. Hood and Chadbourne & Parke ensure a state-court forum for plaintiffs in certain instances.
Obviously, one should not minimize the importance of the continued viability of Rule 23. Even so, the plaintiff-side victories are narrow. They are rooted in substantive securities law and obvious notions of the day-in-court principle. The defendant-side victories are more profound because they concern Rule 23 itself, and thus affect federal class actions generally. Under Wal-Mart, commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) is a higher hurdle in every federal class action. 288 The focus is undeniably less on raising common questions than on generating 283 answers on a class-wide basis. Moreover, money (whether labeled damages or equitable) can be recovered in a Rule 23(b)(2) class only in the Allison-type case in which it flows automatically from the injunctive/declaratory relief and is essentially liquidated. The "equitable relief" and "predominance" arguments for justifying recovery of money in a Rule 23(b)(2) class are no longer viable. Beyond this, the Court has expanded the scope of litigation to be undertaken at the certification stage. Rule 23 does not set forth a pleading standard. 289 The representative must offer "convincing proof" that the requirements are satisfied. This will focus, inter alia, on whether merits issues (such as injury and damages) can be proved at trial en masse. Whether they can be shown en masse will usually entail a battle of experts, and Wal-Mart strongly suggests that expert evidence considered at certification must pass muster under Daubert. This, of course, increases the cost of certification litigation. And it is now clear that courts must not limit litigation of certification issues merely because they overlap with determinations on the merits. 290 Moreover, the court must permit the defendant to present evidence rebutting plaintiffs' claims for certification and, in Rule 10-5 cases, rebutting application of the fraudon-the-market theory.
291
The most profound development, however, comes from Concepcion and Italian Colors. Concepcion emphatically restates that arbitration is a matter of contract, including the adhesion contract.
292
State law mandating class arbitration in the face of a contract to the contrary is preempted. Combining such provisions with class "waivers" creates the perfect storm for plaintiff classes, at least when the expense of litigation outweighs the expected individual recovery. The present state in this regard is the result of the Court's broad application of the FAA and not of class action jurisprudence. In the clash between enforcing contracts as written and ensuring private enforcement of the law, the Court has sided with the former. As a result, for many disputes, the question will not be whether the prerequisites of class certification can be satisfied. It will be whether Rule 23 has any role to play at all. 
